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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 106 of the Internal Revenue Code permits
employees to exclude employer-sponsored health insurance1
from adjusted gross income.2 At the same time, employers may
fully deduct the cost of purchasing health benefits for their
employees.' Taxpayers who are self-employed, however, can
deduct only 30% of the cost of health insurance,4 and no
deduction is available for those who neither are self-employed
nor purchase insurance through their employer unless their
health care expenses exceed 7.5% of their adjusted gross
incomes.5 These provisions of the tax code have created an
* Teaching Fellow, Stanford Law School; J.D. 1994, Stanford Law School;
B.A. 1990, Stanford University. The author thanks Professor Barbara Fried,
Andrew Berke, Pat Konopka, and Srija Srinivasan for their helpful comments and
suggestions on earlier drafts of this essay.
1. For purposes of this essay, the terms "health insurance," "health
coverage," and "health benefits" are interchangeable. They are meant to encompass
all forms of private health coverage, including traditional indemnity insurance,
employer self-insurance programs, preferred provider insurance and organizations
(PPIs and PPOs), and health maintenance organizations (HMOs).
2. 26 U.S.C. § 106 (1989) ("Gross income of an employee does not include
employer-provided coverage under an accident or health plan.").
3. See id. § 162(a)(1).
4. Permanent Extension and Increase of Deduction for Health Insurance
Costs of Self-Employed Individuals, Pub. L. No. 104-7, § 1, 109 Stat. 93 (1995) (to
be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 162). In April 1995, Congress made the deduction
permanent and increased the percentage deductible from the previous level of 25%.
Ann Devroy, Clinton Signs Self-Employed Insurance Deduction, WASH. POST, Apr.
12, 1995, at A9. President Clinton has subsequently proposed increasing the
deduction to 50%. Robert Pear, Administration Proposes Federal Regulation of
Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1995, at A24.
5. 26 U.S.C. § 213 (1988); see also Henry T. Greely, The Regulation of
Private Health Insurance, in HEALTH CARE CORPORATE LAW: FORMATION AND
REGULATION 8-1, 8-23 (Mark A. Hall ed. 1993).
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enormous incentive for taxpayers to acquire health coverage
through employment-related groups.
There are several plausible, public-regarding justifications
for excluding health benefits from taxation. Foremost is that
the government has many self-interested reasons to encourage
taxpayers to purchase private health coverage. Inducing more
consumers to obtain health insurance reduces public health
care expenditures, promotes greater efficiency and equity in the
health care system, and even furthers social justice.'
Moreover, as a theoretical matter, resources devoted to health
insurance arguably should be excluded from taxable income
because they do not reflect a consumer's relative welfare or
taxability.
7
But these justifications do not fully explain the current tax
treatment of health benefits. First, these rationales do not
account for extending the tax preference only to
employer-sponsored insurance. This restriction is inequitable
and regressive, benefiting those taxpayers for whom private
health coverage is generally the least expensive.8  These
justifications also fail to explain why taxpayers are permitted
to exclude the full cost of their health insurance regardless of
the type of plan in which they enroll. The full exclusion allowed
by § 106 actually undermines the government's objectives of
reducing public health care expenditures and promoting the
efficient delivery of care.9
The tax treatment of health benefits also aggravates
several existing problems in the private health insurance
market. By shielding consumers from the true cost of health
coverage, the tax code harmfully distorts purchasing decisions,
making demand for health coverage both excessive and
cost-unconscious.'" And by establishing such strong incentives
for taxpayers to obtain coverage through their employers, § 106
has tied the purchase of health insurance to the employment
setting, creating the p:roblem of "job lock.""
This essay argues that the tax treatment of health benefits
needs reform. Part 1I examines the government's possible
6. See infra text accompanying notes 42-58.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 60-68.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 69-81.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 82-88.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 116-149.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 95-115.
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rationales, both practical and theoretical, for exempting
employer-sponsored health benefits from taxation. Part III
critiques these justifications and contends that the exclusion is
both underinclusive and overextensive. Part IV discusses the
detrimental impact of the current tax treatment of health
benefits on the health insurance market. Finally, Part V argues
that the government could solve many of the problems
attributable to the tax treatment of health benefits by
implementing three basic changes: (1) permitting all taxpayers
to exclude or deduct the cost of acquiring health insurance, (2)
limiting the amount of the exclusion or deduction to the
regionally-adjusted cost of a standard benefits package, and (3)
eliminating the tax provision that permits employees to pay
their portion of their health insurance premiums with pretax
dollars.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE CURRENT TAX TREATMENT OF
HEALTH BENEFITS
A. Instrumental Rationales
One plausible explanation for exempting employer-spon-
sored health insurance from taxation is that this exemption
induces more taxpayers to obtain private health coverage. Ar-
guably, the government has several compelling reasons for
promoting the proliferation of private health insurance. By
encouraging consumers to enroll in private plans, the govern-
ment (1) reduces overall health expenditures, (2) decreases its
own health care costs, (3) promotes a more equitable distribu-
tion of costs among health care recipients, and (4) decreases
the number of Americans forced into poverty due to catastroph-
ic illnesses. 2
Although approximately forty-one million Americans do not
have health insurance of any kind," every American actually
12. Another possible rationale for subsidizing taxpayers' purchase of private
health coverage is more paternalistic. One could reasonably argue that, because
people tend to discount the likelihood and cost of future illness, too few consumers
purchase health coverage. See VICTOR R. FUCHS, THE HEALTH ECONOMY 265-66
(1986). In this light, § 106 aims to remedy the market imperfection of incomplete
information for consumers. The exclusion simply raises the otherwise artificially
low demand for health insurance to an efficient level. Under this theory, the ex-
clusion merely amounts to a subsidy designed to coddle consumers into doing what
is in their own best interest.
13. Spencer Rich, More Access to Health Insurance Proposed: Key Features of
Original Plan Abandoned; Medicare Savings Goal Rises, WASH. POST, June 14,
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has some access to health care. A patchwork of laws, programs,
and public providers guarantees that even uninsured patients
receive medical care at least in emergency situations. Most
notably, the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act (EMTALA)'4 requires all hospitals with emergency
care facilities to screen any patient who applies for emergency
care. 5 If hospital staff determine that the patient needs emer-
gency treatment, 6 EMTALA requires the hospital to treat the
patient until her condition has stabilized. 7 Hospitals or physi-
cians who violate the requirements of EMTALA are subject to
civil fines,'8 private actions, 9 and exclusion from Medicare
or Medicaid reimbursement." Another federal law, the
Hill-Burton Act, also requires many hospitals to provide care to
uninsured patients.2 ' Hill-Burton mandates that all hospitals
that have received federal construction loans offer a minimum
level of "community service" in the form of uncompensated
care.
22
Notwithstanding the provisions of EMTALA and
Hill-Burton, as well as various state law requirements, 23 pri-
vate providers generally avoid treating uninsured patients
because of the uncertainty of being reimbursed for providing
the care. Consequently, uninsured patients receive the majority
of their medical treatment at public health care facilities.24
1995, at A21. Approximately 160 million Americans have private health insurance,
while the remaining 55 million have coverage through a publicly sponsored pro-
gram such as Medicare, Medicaid, the Veterans Administration, or the Indian
Health Service. See Eli Ginzberg, The Limits of Health Reform-Revisited, 3 STAN.
L. & POLY REV. 195, 195 (1991).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). Congress enacted
EMTALA as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985,
Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)-(c) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). For a thorough discus-
sion of EMTALA's provisions, see Demetrios G. Metropoulos, Note, Son of COBRA:
The Evolution of a Federal Malpractice Law, 45 STAN. L. REV. 263 (1992).
16. The statute defines an emergency medical condition as one in which "the
absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected" to cause
serious harm to the patient. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)-(c) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
18. Id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(A)-(B) (Supp. II 1990).
19. Id. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (Supp. II 1990).
20. Id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
21. See id. § 291 (1988).
22. See id. § 291c(e) (1988).
23. Several states have imposed a duty on hospitals to provide emergency
medical services to all patients seeking such care. See Erik J. Olson, Note, No
Room at the Inn: A Snapshot of an American Emergency Room, 46 STAN. L. REV.
449, 453-58 (1994).
24. See Emily Friedman, Problems Plaguing Public Hospitals: Uninsured Pa-
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Public providers, composed primarily of city and county hospi-
tals, generally must provide care to community residents re-
gardless of the patients' ability to pay.25 This safety net pro-
vides millions of dollars worth of care to uninsured patients
each year.2 ' For instance, Cook County Hospital in Chicago
treats roughly 1,250 uninsured patients each day, roughly half
its patient total.2 ' Likewise, nine-tenths of the patients treat-
ed by the New York Health and Hospitals Corporation are
either Medicaid recipients or uninsured.28 And 30% of the pa-
tients treated at Los Angeles County-University of Southern
California Medical Center, which serves a majority of the
county's poor residents, are uninsured.29
This patchwork of private and public providers effectively
guarantees uninsured patients a very basic level of health care.
While the majority of the uninsured cannot afford health insur-
ance,30 some individuals, relying on the existence of this safe-
ty net, do not purchase private health coverage even though
they could afford it. They are "individuals who remain unin-
sured because they believe that in the event of serious illness
they will get care anyway, and others will pick up the bill."3'
Roughly 75 to 80% of the uninsured are either employed or the
tient Transfers, Tight Funds, Mismanagement, and Misperception, 257 JAMA 1850,
1850-51 (1987). All told, over 65% of the patients treated at the one hundred mem-
ber institutions of the National Association of Public Hospitals are Medicaid recipi-
ents or low income uninsured or underinsured. Health Care Service Delivery Infra-
structure in Inner-City and Rural Communities: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 206
(1993) (statement of Ruth Rothstein, Director, Cook County Hospital) [hereinafter
Hearings on Health Care Service Delivery Infrastructure].
25. For example, statutes in California and New York require public hospitals
to provide treatment to all patients seeking care. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 17000 (Deering 1988); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 129 (McKinney 1990).
26. A recent study estimated that American hospitals provided $13.2 billion in
uncompensated care in 1989. John Holahan & Sheila Zedlewski, Who Pays for
Health Care in the United States? Implications for Health System Reform, 29 IN-
QUIRY 231, 235 (1992).
27. Hearings on Health Care Service Delivery Infrastructure, supra note 24, at
205 (statement of Ruth Rothstein).
28. Id. at 216 (statement of Regina Morris, Chief Operating Officer of the
New York Health and Hospitals Corporation).
29. James Sterngold, Budget Slashes Could Close Hospital: Issues in Los An-
geles: To Trim Costs or the Quality of Care?, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1995, at A7.
30. Gail R. Wilensky, Filling the Gaps in Health Insurance: Impact on Compe-
tition, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1988, at 133, 135 (noting that 69% of the uninsured
earn less than $10,000).
31. Victor R. Fuchs, National Health Insurance Revisited, HEALTH AFF., Win-
ter 1991, at 7, 9.
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dependents of employed persons,32 and, as of 1986, 25% of the
uninsured reported family incomes in excess of $30,000. 33
Those individuals who could purchase health coverage but
nevertheless do not are "free riders" on the American health
care system.3 4 Although assured of receiving emergency medi-
cal treatment, they frequently pay less than the true cost of
their care and sometimes pay nothing at all, shifting their costs
onto other participants in the system.35
Three sources finance the majority of care delivered to
uninsured patients in the United States. The first source is
uninsured patients themselves. Health care providers, like
other creditors, require patients to pay for as much of their
care as possible. Even public hospitals generally require pa-
tients to pay for their care according to a sliding fee scale based
on the patient's ability to pay.36 The second major source of
financing for uninsured care is government medical programs
for indigent persons. Uninsured patients may spend down their
assets to the point that they qualify for Medicaid, the joint
state-federal program. designed to provide medical care to per-
sons unable to afford necessary medical care.3 ' They may also
be eligible for local or state government programs for indigent
care, or receive uncompensated care from public safety net pro-
viders.38 The final source is provider cross-subsidization.
When neither the patient nor the government adequately reim-
burses a provider for the cost of treating uninsured patients,
the provider must cover its uncompensated costs by
cross-subsidizing. 39 Tliat is, the provider must increase its
32. Wilensky, supra note 30, at 135.
33. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Toward a Fail-Safe Health-Insurance System, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 11, 1989, at A10.
34. See Alain C. Entihoven, Managed Competition: An Agenda for Action,
HEALTH AFF., Summer 1988. at 25, 30 (stating that "a free market is likely to lead
to the noncoverage or undercoverage of large numbers of people" and that "many
consumers will seek a 'free ride'").
35. See Alain Enthovea & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health Plan
for the 1990s: Universal Health Insurance in a System Designed to Promote Quality
and Economy (Part 1), 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 29, 30 (1989) ("[Wlhen the unin-
sured are seriously ill (and most expenses are for seriously ill patients), taxpayers,
insured persons, or both end up paying for most of their care. Voluntarily or invol-
untarily, some people are taking a free ride.").
36. Telephone Interview with Srija Srinivasan, Chief Budget Analyst, Health
Department, San Mateo County, Cal. (July 12, 1993).
37. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (1988).
38. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29.
39. Even if a patient is Medicaid eligible, Medicaid will likely only reimburse
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charges to patients with adequate coverage, ostensibly those
with private insurance,4" to subsidize the costs of treating un-
insured patients. Approximately 25% of the average hospital
bill for a privately insured patient goes toward cross-subsidiza-
tion.4'
Given this system for financing the care of persons who
lack private health coverage, the extent to which Americans
choose not to purchase health insurance has significant public
policy ramifications. It affects how equitably the costs of the
health care system are allocated, the level of government's
health care expenditures, and the overall efficiency of the
health care system. By inducing more taxpayers to purchase
health insurance, the government advances four significant
policy objectives. First, it reduces the number of free riders.
More taxpayers with private health coverage means more indi-
viduals pay something into the system who otherwise would
contribute less than their actual cost. As a result, health care
costs are borne more equitably.42
the provider for a percentage of its actual costs. A 1990 study showed that, on
average, Medicaid pays approximately 55% of what private insurers pay for the
same services. Anne Schwartz et al., Variation in Medicaid Physician Fees, HEALTH
AFF., Spring 1991, at 131, 136-38. In some cases, reimbursement can be much less.
In 1986, Maryland's Medicaid program reimbursed obstetricians as little as 26% of
their regular charge for routine deliveries. Michael H. Fox et al., Effect of Medicaid
Payment Levels on Access to Obstetrical Care, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1992, at 150,
160 exhibit 6.
40. Hospitals previosly used Medicare patients to cross-subsidize the cost of
uncompensated care. In 1983, however, Medicare began its conversion to the Pro-
spective Payment System (PPS). See Michael D. Rosko, A Comparison of Hospital
Performance Under the Partial-Payer Medicare PPS and State All-Payer
Rate-Setting Systems, 26 INQUIRY 48, 49 (1989). Under PPS, Medicare pays hospi-
tals a fixed amount for each patient based on the patient's diagnosis regardless of
how much care the patient actually requires. Id. Under the first year of PPS, hos-
pital margins on PPS patients was 14.5%, but by 1990 it had shrunk nearly to
zero. Stuart Guterman et al., Hospitals' Financial Performance in the First Five
Years of PPS, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1990, at 125, 126; see also Jack Hadley et al.,
Profits and Fiscal Pressure in the Prospective Payment System: Their Impacts on
Hospitals, 26 INQUIRY 354, 354 (1989). Consequently, cross-subsidization using
Medicare patients is virtually impossible. Extra charges to recover the costs of
uncompensated care are, therefore, concentrated almost exclusively in the bills of
the privately insured.
41. Ron Winslow, National Health Plan Wins Unlikely Backer: Business, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 5, 1989, at B1. Because of increasing competition, however, this figure
is declining.
42. See Enthoven & Kronick, supra note 35, at 30 ("Those who can do so
ought to contribute their fair share to their coverage and be insured."). A recent
proposal for national health insurance stated that an important goal of any reform
package must be to eliminate the "unnecessary and unfair cross-subsidization"
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Second, enrolling more Americans in private health plans
lessens the government's burden in financing and providing
health care.43 Fewer uninsured individuals means fewer pa-
tients for whom the government must finance or provide care,
either through Medicaid or other programs for indigent per-
sons. Because of increasing pressure to reduce the federal bud-
get deficit, as well as the concomitant need for state and local
governments to balance their budgets, containing spiraling
health care spending has become an imperative across the
political spectrum. For instance, President Clinton has repeat-
edly asserted that "[tihe key to long-term deficit reduction is
controlling health care costs through health care reform.""
Similarly, House Speaker Newt Gingrich has stated that "we
have to rethink our health system" because current spending
trends will lead to a "financial crash," and that Republicans in
Congress will "make every decision" regarding health care
"within the context of getting to a balanced budget."45 Reduc-
ing health care costs is critical to deficit reduction. Through its
various programs, the federal government funds more than
30% of all personal health care purchased in the United
States,46 and these outlays constitute the fastest growing con-
tributor to the federal deficit.47 The government can reduce
produced by the current system. Mark V. Pauly et al., A Plan for 'Responsible
National Health Insurance,' HEALTH AFF., Spring 1991, at 5, 7.
43. A separate question, not addressed here, is whether excluding
employer-sponsored health insurance from taxation is a cost effective subsidy. It is
quite possible that the foregone tax revenue caused by the exclusion exceeds the
government's savings in financing and providing health care attributable to § 106's
inducement to purchase private insurance. It is estimated that eliminating the
exclusion for employer-provided health benefits would increase federal tax revenues
by $35.6 billion. M. Susan Marquis & Joan L. Buchanan, How Will Changes in
Health Insurance Tax Policy and Employer Health Plan Contributions Affect Access
to Health Care and Health Care Costs?, 271 JAMA 939, 944 (1994).
44. Pear, supra note 4, at A24.
45. Balancing the Health Care Budget, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1995, at A26.
46. Greely, supra note 5, at 8-20. According to surveys done by the American
Hospital Association and the National Association of Public Hospitals, the govern-
ment pays for 47% of hospital care given at private hospitals and 75% of that
given at public hospitals. Kevin Sack, Hard Cases at the Hospital Door, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 1995, § 4, at 5.
47. Dana Priest, Canadian-Style Plan 1st in Cost-Cutting, WASH. POST, July
25, 1993, at A15; see also Spencer Rich, Soaring Health Care Costs Heavy Burden
for Agency, WASH. POST, June 24, 1993, at A17. The government pays directly for
roughly 42% of all health care expenditures in the United States. VICTOR R.
FUCHS, THE FuTURE OF HEALTH POLICY 38 (1993).
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these expenditures and shift some of its risk to private insurers
by enticing more taxpayers to purchase private coverage.
Third, inducing more Americans to purchase private cover-
age increases the number of persons who have access to prima-
ry care, thereby promoting greater efficiency in medical
treatment. For several reasons, the uninsured generally do not
receive sufficient preventive medical services provided by pri-
mary care physicians. For example, because the uninsured
must pay the entire cost of outpatient visits out of pocket, they
often attempt to "get by" without seeing a primary care doctor
until their conditions have become truly serious.48 At the
same time, many primary care providers simply refuse to see
uninsured patients, fearing that the care will go uncompensat-
ed.49 Moreover, under the weight of rising costs and shrinking
budgets, local governments have been forced to reduce their
primary care programs.5" Most notably, Los Angeles County
decided in August 1995 to close all six of its comprehensive
medical centers and twenty-nine of its thirty-nine community
clinics, virtually eliminating the County's outpatient servic-
es.61 As a result, most public providers-to whom the unin-
sured most often turn for care-cannot meet the demand for
outpatient care.52
48. A study of the uninsured population in the District of Columbia found
that, of those uninsured patients reporting a problem in access to primary care,
61.9% indicated cost as the most significant barrier. John Billings & Nina Teicholz,
Uninsured Patients in District of Columbia Hospitals, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1990,
at 158, 162 exhibit 3.
49. Olson, supra note 23, at 464 ("Medicaid and uninsured patients are gener-
ally unable to obtain primary care in physicians' offices."). Studies of the services
physicians offer Medicaid beneficiaries have rather conclusively demonstrated
physicians' sensitivity to reimbursement rates. For instance, a recent study showed
that access to physicians for Medicaid beneficiaries was highly correlated with the
state Medicaid payment levels, so that 'when competing payers pay higher fees,
physicians are less likely to treat Medicaid patients." Schwartz et al., supra note
39, at 132. But see Olson, supra note 23, at 478 (noting that a study of Medicaid
recipients in Maine showed that a 60% increase in physician reimbursement rates
increased physician services by only 10%).
50. See, e.g., Douglas P. Shuit, Indigent Patients Face Uncertainty, Chaos,
Risk, L.A. TIES, Aug. 3, 1995, at B10 (discussing reduction of public primary care
services in Los Angeles County); Barbara Walsh, Needy Will Feel Effects of IRS
Cuts: Budget for Broward's Public Clinics Is Being Trimmed by 4,437,353, FT.
LAUD. SUN-SENTINEL, July 6, 1995, at 3B (reporting that the budget for public
health clinics in Broward County, Florida, was reduced by 32%, which could mean
that "thousands of uninsured people may not get prenatal care, immunizations or
treatment for EIV and other sexually transmitted diseases").
51. Kevin Sack, Public Hospitals Around the Country Cut Basic Service, N.Y.
TamS, Aug. 16, 1995, § 1, at 1.
52. Regina Morris, chief operating officer of the NYCHHC, has estimated that
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These barriers to primary care undermine the efficient
delivery of care and may actually increase the overall cost of
treating the uninsured. Illnesses and conditions afflicting unin-
sured patients that could be treated early and inexpensively by
primary care physicians frequently become serious and cost-
ly.5 3 For example, a 1990 study of the uninsured population in
the District of Columbia revealed that appropriate primary care
could have prevented 23.5% of all hospital admissions of unin-
sured patients.54 A more recent study of preventable hospital
admissions in California's urban areas found an elevated rate
of admission for patients living in communities with greater
proportions of uninsured residents.55 In addition, those unin-
sured patients who do manage to obtain primary care often
receive it in extremely expensive settings. Thousands of un-
insured patients visit hospital emergency rooms for routine
treatment because they are unable to obtain outpatient care.5"
Such treatment could be administered much less expensively in
a primary care physician's office or a community clinic.5" In
New York City public health facilities meet only 5% of the demand for outpatient
services. Hearings on Health Care Service Delivery Infrastructure, supra note 24, at
217.
53. See Pete Stark, The MediPlan Health Care Act of 1991: H.R. 650, 3 STAN.
L. & PoLy REv. 33, 34 (1991) ("Research shows that uninsured persons are less
likely to have children appropriately immunized, less likely to receive prenatal
care, and less likely to see a physician if they have serious symptoms.").
54. Billings & Teicholz, supra note 48, at 163 exhibit 4; see also Carol
Goldberg, Health Care Reform: How Ready Is LI?, LI BUS. NEWS, July 25, 1994, at
21 (reporting that, in 1992, more than twenty-four thousand Long Island, New
York, residents "were admitted to area hospitals for reasons that might have been
prevented through primary care," resulting in $154.8 million in "avoidable costs").
55. Andrew B. Bindman et al., Preventable Hospitalizations and Access to
Health Care, 274 JAMA 305, 308-09 (1995). The study also found that, for resi-
dents of communities with the worst access to primary care, the preventable hospi-
talization rate was roughly four times higher than for residents of communities
with the greatest access. Id. at 308.
56. See Olson, supra note 23, at 464.
57. See id. at 483 (noting that a "community clinic can offer primary care
less expensively than a hospital emergency room because it need not stand ready
to deliver urgent care throughout the day"). Recall that EMTALA requires all hos-
pitals with emergency care facilities to at least screen every patient applying for
care. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, emergency
rooms are often the only place the uninsured are assured of receiving immediate
care.
An additional-but non-financial-cost of administering primary care in emer-
gency rooms is that it diverts staff and resources from true emergencies. This, in
turn, may lead to additional inefficiencies, such as overstaffing. Olson, supra note
23, at 477.
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short, lack of access to primary care results in inefficient treat-
ment of the uninsured.
Finally, encouraging more taxpayers to purchase health
coverage reduces the number of individuals who spend down
their assets into poverty. When an uninsured patient is strick-
en with a catastrophic medical condition, she will first be
forced to spend all her available cash to finance her care. After
depleting this source, she will have to begin liquidating her
assets. This process frequently pushes individuals or families
into poverty. By inducing more taxpayers to obtain private
coverage, the government reduces the incidence of so-called
"spend down." This may not itself reduce health care expendi-
tures, but it has beneficial secondary effects. For instance, it
reduces the financial strain on government antipoverty pro-
grams such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), state-administered general assistance, food stamps,
and the earned income tax credit.
In sum, the government has several salient reasons to
encourage taxpayers to purchase private health coverage. As
Senator John Rockefeller, chair of the U.S. Bipartisan Commis-
sion on Comprehensive Health Care Reform (the Pepper Com-
mission), recently wrote, "gaps in [health] coverage are fueling
health care inflation and costing billions of dollars-in emer-
gency care that could have been prevented [and] in uncompen-
sated care that gets shifted to the cash registers and pocket-
books of employers and employees with health insurance."58
Excluding employer-sponsored health benefits from taxable
income might therefore be a defensible means to induce more
Americans to enroll in private health plans.
B. Theoretical Rationales for Section 106
Alternatively, one might explain excluding
employer-sponsored health insurance from taxation on more
theoretical grounds. In his seminal article, Personal Deductions
in an Ideal Income Tax, William Andrews articulated a theory
for the "ideal" tax base for the personal income tax.59 Andrews
posited that "the ultimate purpose" of the income tax "is to
apportion tax burdens in uniform, graduated relation to real
58. John D. Rockefeller IV, Health and the Underserved: Policy Decisions, 3
STAN. L. & POLY REV. 27, 28 (1991).
59. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86
HARV. L. REV. 309 (1972).
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consumption and accumulation."" While actual money expen-
ditures are a sound starting point, Andrews argued that the
allocation of resources for certain purposes is not personal
consumption.6' Among such expenditures is the purchase of
medical care.62
Andrews closely examined the medical expense deduction,
currently § 213 of tfhe code.63 He essentially contended that
expenditures for medical care are not personal consumption
because, rather than increasing a taxpayer's relative welfare,
they merely return the taxpayer to a baseline state of good
health.64 If the goal of the income tax is to allocate the burden
according to "material well-being and taxable capacity," then
medical expenses should be excluded because they do not re-
flect a growth in the taxpayer's ability to pay.65 As Andrews
explained,
differences in health affect relative material well-being. It
would be impractical to try to include robust good health
directly as an element of personal consumption for those who
have it, but the difference between good and poor health can
be partially reflected-or the failure to include the difference
directly can be partially offset-by also excluding or allowing
a deduction for the medical services that those in poorer
health will generally need more of.66
The analogy between the exclusion of employee-sponsored
health insurance and the medical expense deduction under
§ 213 is imperfect, but much of the logic of Andrews's defense
of § 213 applies to the § 106 exclusion as well. Like medical ex-
penses, health insurance is "an intermediate good whose ulti-
mate object is good health."6' Resources dedicated to health
coverage arguably do not reflect a taxpayer's well-being any
more than do expenditures on medical care. Thus, one could
say that § 106 is justifiable on similar grounds: Resources de-
60. Id. at 331.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 331-43.
63. 6 U.S.C. § 213 (1988). Section 213 permits taxpayers itemizing their de-
ductions to deduct health care expenses that exceed 7.5% of adjusted gross income.
Id. When Andrews wrote his article, the floor was 3.0%, Andrews, supra note 59,
at 332, but the difference (and the floor in general) is irrelevant to this discussion.
64. Andrews, supra note 59, at 335-37.
65. Id. at 335.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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voted to health insurance are not the "right basis for making
interpersonal welfare comparisons on which to base the dis-
tribution of tax burdens"" because they do not augment an
individual's relative welfare.
III. DIFFICULTIES IN JUSTIFYING THE TAx TREATMENT OF
HEALTH BENEFITS
A. Problems with the Instrumental Justification
While the government may have legitimate reasons for
encouraging taxpayers to purchase private health coverage, its
justifications cannot fully account for the current tax treatment
of health benefits. First, although § 106 may stimulate demand
for private health insurance, the exclusion is available only to
those taxpayers purchasing coverage through their employer.
Not only is this restriction horizontally inequitable, it is also
regressive." The exclusion is most valuable to taxpayers with
the highest incomes, and it subsidizes the purchase of health
benefits for those who are disproportionately well-off and who
already have access to relatively high quality and inexpensive
health insurance.7"
By excluding the cost of employer-sponsored health cover-
age from taxation, § 106 provides a subsidy for the purchasers
of health insurance who least need it. Taxpayers unable to
obtain employer-sponsored insurance must either acquire in-
surance through another group or purchase individually under-
written insurance. For several reasons-even ignoring tax ef-
fects-employer-sponsored insurance is less expensive than
that purchased by alternative means.7' The biggest reason for
the discrepancy is that selling health insurance to an
employment-related group minimizes the risk of "adverse selec-
tion."72 Adverse selection refers to the problem that those who
68. Id.
69. See Pauly et al., supra note 42, at 9. But see Thomas D. Griffith, Theo-
ries of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 355-60 (1989)
(contending that commentators have generally exaggerated the regressivity of the
medical expense deduction).
70. See Steven Findlay, Will Clinton End a Tax Exclusion on Benefits?, BUS.
& HEALTH, Feb. 1993, at 51 (remarking that the § 106 exclusion "benefits the
well-off disproportionately" because, as a group, "they have better access to and can
afford more health coverage").
71. Harold S. Luft & Robert H. Miller, Patient Selection in a Competitive
Health Care System, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1988, at 97, 100.
72. Greely, supra note 5, at 8-16.
HeinOnline  -- 1995 BYU L. Rev. 1241 1995
1242 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1995
choose to purchase health coverage generally represent a
self-selecting, disproportionately unhealthy group. The problem
arises because rational consumers will not purchase insurance
until they believe that the cost of their claims will exceed the
cost of their premiums.73 Selling insurance through employers
minimizes the risk of adverse selection because
employment-related groups constitute preexisting groups
formed for a purpose other than to purchase health insurance.
But when a consumer seeks to purchase health insurance indi-
vidually, the risk of adverse selection is high. Consequently,
insurers attempt to protect themselves by screening applicants
for health problems (medical underwriting), 4 limiting cover-
age, and charging significantly higher premiums. 5
A second reason health benefits purchased through an
employment-related group are less expensive than individual
insurance is that offering coverage through an employer signif-
icantly reduces administrative costs.76 In an employment set-
ting, insurers need to interact only with group representatives
(rather than each enrollee) for marketing and day-to-day ad-
ministration. Also, because employment groups substantially
mitigate the risk of adverse selection, insurers can avoid the
administrative expenses involved in medical underwrit-
ing-rigorously questioning, examining, or monitoring each
73. As a result, "from the perspective of the organization providing the health
coverage, those who select the coverage will present 'adverse' claims experience;
they will have higher costs than the general population's average." Greely, supra
note 5, at 8-14.
74. Id. at 8-17 ("Medical underwriting is widely used in selling individual
health coverage, by both conventional insurers and HMOs.").
75. Luft & Miller, supra note 71, at 102. Insurance companies are at a sub-
stantial disadvantage because, as Luft and Miller explain, "the prospective enrollee
is likely to know far more about his or her health than the insurer is. Therefore,
carriers often restrict enrollment, require medical exams, or exclude coverage for
preexisting conditions." Id. Adverse selection is an enormous obstacle in the market
for individual health insurance because there is no constriction on who is eligible
to purchase coverage-there is no preexisting group with a commonality other than
the desire to purchase health coverage. Adverse selection is also a problem, albeit
less of one, for insurers selling to groups unrelated to employment. Because mem-
bership in these groups is often fairly costless, insurers fear that members have
joined solely to gain access to health coverage. In contrast, there is almost no risk
of adverse selection in employee groups because the availability of coverage gener-
ally plays a smaller role in the individual's decision to join the group. Without
reason to suspect that those purchasing employer-sponsored insurance will be un-
usually unhealthy, insurers can still offer lower premiums and better coverage to
employment-related groups.
76. Greely, supra note 5, at 8-16; Pauly et al., supra note 42, at 7.
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beneficiary.7 Thus, even assuming an inducement to purchase
health insurance is appropriate, § 106 tends to confer the bene-
fit on those taxpayers for whom coverage is the least expensive:
those with access to benefits through an employer.
Section 106 is also regressive in at least two other respects.
First, as a group, those taxpayers able to obtain health cover-
age through their employers are disproportionately well-off.7"
In 1989, roughly 95% of all individuals with personal incomes
over $30,000 had employer-sponsored health insurance.7 9 By
comparison, only 80% of those idividuals with incomes between
$15,000 and $20,000, and 70% with incomes between $12,500
and $15,000, had employer-provided coverage."0 Second, like
any exclusion or deduction, § 106 is most valuable to those
taxpayers in the highest tax brackets.8 ' For example, the ex-
clusion is worth $1,800 to a taxpayer in the 36% marginal tax
bracket purchasing a $5,000 health insurance package; it is
only worth $750 to a taxpayer in the 15% marginal tax bracket
buying the same coverage.
In addition to being regressive, the value of the § 106 ex-
clusion is overextensive: It subsidizes the purchase of health
benefits beyond that necessary to accomplish the government's
instrumental objectives. Health benefit packages come in sever-
al varieties, and most large employers offer their employees a
choice among plans. 2 There are minimum, no-frills packages
77. See Greely, supra note 5, at 8-16. The savings in administering a health
plan through a large employer can be enormous. Roughly 5.5% of premium dollars
go towards administrative costs in companies with 10,000 or more employees. Bry-
an Dowd & Roger Feldman, Insurer Competition and Protection from Risk Redefini-
tion in the Individual and Small Group Health Insurance Market, 29 INQUIRY 148,
148 (1992). In contrast, the figure is close to 40% for individually underwritten
policies. See John Y. Inglehart, The American Health Care System: Private Insur-
ance, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1715, 1719 (1992).
78. See Richard Kronick, Health Insurance, 1979-1989: The Frayed Connection
Between Employment and Insurance, 28 INQUIRY 318 (1991).
79. Id. at 322.
80. Id.
81. See STANLEY SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX
EXPENDITURES 37 (1973) ("The translation and consequent restatement of a tax
expenditure program in direct expenditure terms generally shows an upside-down
result utterly at variance with usual expenditure policies.").
82. See generally Stanley B. Jones, Multiple Choice Health Insurance: The
Lessons and Challenge to Private Insurers, 27 INQUIRY 161 (1990). One of the rea-
sons employers offer a choice among plans is the HMO Act of 1973. Pub. L. No.
93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1988)). The HMO Act
requires companies with 25 or more employees to offer an option between at least
two health plans, one of which must be an HMO. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-9(a)(1) (1988).
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as well as "premium" plans offering various additional benefits.
For instance, a basic package may restrict the number of pro-
viders which the beneficiary may see, require a higher deduct-
ible, and exclude "luxury" items like orthodontics, cosmetic
surgery, or experimental treatments. Premium packages, on
the other hand, may cover these luxury items, permit beneficia-
ries to see any physician, or reimburse beneficiaries for the
extra costs of private hospital rooms.
Health insurance packages also vary widely in the efficien-
cy of their reimbursement schemes. More expensive health
plans frequently reimburse hospitals and physicians on a
fee-for-service basis, giving providers the financial incentive to
prescribe excessive treatment." By contrast, less expensive
plans often pay providers on a capitation basis-paying a flat
sum per enrollee regardless of how much care is provided.
Several studies have demonstrated that capitation payment
schemes, most commonly used by health maintenance organiza-
tions (HMOs), can significantly reduce costs while providing
the same level of care. 4 For instance, studies have reported
that HMOs paying providers on a capitation basis reduce hospi-
tal use by 10 to 40% as compared with fee-for-service reim-
bursement mechanisms. 85 Of course, part of HMOs' ability to
83. See Harold S. Luft, Translating the U.S. HMO Experience to Other Health
Systems, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1991, at 172, 175 (stating that, of the various health
care reimbursement mechanisms, "fee-for-service payment gives physicians the
strongest incentives to offer more services"); Janet L. Shikles & Lawrence H.
Thompson, Strategies to Reduce Health Care Spending and Increase Coverage, 3
STAN. L. & POLY REV. 103, 104 (1991) ("[Under a fee-for-service system, [physi-
cians] have little incentive to control costs; reimbursement increases as more ser-
vices are provided.").
84. See Robert C. Bradbury et al., Comparing Hospital Length of Stay in
Independent Practice Association HMOs and Traditional Insurance Programs, 28
INQUIRY 87, 92 (1991) (finding that, "even after controlling for patient age, sex,
case mix ... severity of illness, and year of admission," membership in an HMO
was "associated with shorter hospital stays"); Luft, supra note 83, at 185 ("There is
substantial evidence that ... [during the] 1980s, many HMOs were able to pro-
vide care for their enrollees at substantially lower cost than fee-for-service care.").
Some have argued, however, that capitation payment schemes--especially those
in which doctors cannot spread their financial risk over many patients-create too
strong of an incentive for physicians to skimp on care. See, e.g., Alan L. Hillman,
Financial Incentives for Physicians in HMOs: Is There a Conflict of Interest?, 317
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1743 (1987); Alan L. Hillman et al., How Do Financial Incen-
tives Affect Physicians' Clinical Decisions and the Financial Performance of Health
Maintenance Organizations?, 321 NEW ENG. J. M4ED. 86 (1989).
85. Ira Strumwasser et al., The Triple Option Choice: Self-Selection Bias in
Traditional Coverage, HMOs, and PPOs, 26 INQUIRY 432, 432 (1989); see also Jerry
L. Malshaw & Theodore R. Marmor, Conceptualizing, Estimating, and Reforming
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reduce utilization and costs is attributable to their attraction of
healthier enrollees and the participation of physicians with
more parsimonious practice styles.86 Nonetheless, the Con-
gressional Budget Office estimated in March 1994 that, con-
trolling for the health status of enrollees, the most effective
HMOs reduce the use of services by nine percent and decrease
costs by four percent from traditional fee-for-service plans."
By permitting taxpayers to exclude the full cost of more expen-
sive fee-for-service plans, the government may actually be sub-
sidizing the inefficient provision of care."8
Justifying § 106 on the ground that it encourages more
taxpayers to purchase health coverage thus cannot account for
extending the exclusion beyond the cost of a standard benefits
package operated by an efficient insurer. The government
would more effectively advance its objective of promoting the
efficient delivery of care if it instead rewarded taxpayers for
selecting basic plans that employ efficient reimbursement
mechanisms. Consequently, if the objective of the exclusion is
to reduce health care expenditures and promote the efficient
delivery of care, § 106 makes sense only to the extent that it
exempts no more than the average cost of an efficiently admin-
istered basic benefit plan.
B. Problems with the Theoretical Justification
The theoretical justification for excluding health benefits
from taxation-that health insurance does not augment a
taxpayer's material well-being or taxability-suffers from infir-
mities similar to those that undermine § 106's instrumental
Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Healthcare Spending, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 455, 457
(1994) ("Studies suggest that, in some instances, HMOs may reduce hospital use by
40% and total spending by 25%.").
86. See John M. Eisenberg, Economics, 273 JAMA 1670, 1670 (1995). For in-
stance, a General Accounting Office study found that 54% to 63% of HMOs accept-
ing Medicare recipients enrolled Medicare beneficiaries who were healthier than
average (favorable selection), and that the remaining HMOs enjoyed neutal selec-
tion. Id. at 1671 (citing U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MANAGED HEALTH
CARE: EFFECT ON EMPLOYERS' COSTS DIFFICULT TO MEASURE (1993)). HMOs en-
rolled Medicare recipients who, on average, reported fewer disability days and
lower hospital use prior to their enrollment than those recipients who remained in
the fee-for-service plans. Id.
87. Id. at 1671 (citing CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF MANAGED
CARE: AN UPDATE (1994)).
88. See Alain C. Enthoven, Good Cap, Bd Cap, WASH. POST, July 13, 1993,
at A15.
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justifications. First, the theoretical justification fails to explain
why the exclusion or deduction is limited to
employer-sponsored insurance. If the acquisition of
employer-provided health coverage does not augment the mate-
rial well-being of an individual, neither can health insurance
obtained individually or through an alternative group. Whether
the purchase of health insurance theoretically constitutes per-
sonal consumption cannot depend on the means through which
it is acquired.
The ideal income tax base explanation is also flawed in a
more fundamental respect. Namely, the purchase of health
insurance, or at least a portion of it, frequently does fall within
Andrews' conception of personal consumption. Andrews con-
tended that medical expenses are not personal consumption
because they do no more than maintain a taxpayer's level of
accumulation and taxability. 9 When a taxpayer purchases a
health benefits package offering more than standard coverage,
those dollars going toward the "premium" elements of the pack-
age seem to fit Andrews's conception of personal consumption.
That is, premium benefits do more than finance the taxpayer's
maintenance of a baseline level of good health; they insure that
the taxpayer will be especially healthy, or that, in the event of
illness, she will be brought back to good health in a relatively
luxurious fashion.
Mark Kelman has criticized Andrews's defense of the § 213
medical expense deduction on similar grounds."0 Kelman
rightfully noted that Andrews's argument rests in large part on
the assumption that the amount an individual spends on
health care is an accurate measure of the cost of maintaining
the taxpayer's baseline state of good health. Indeed, the
amount that taxpayers spend on health care reflects more than
just the severity of their health problems.91 As Kelman point-
ed out, personal health care expenses turn largely on the
taxpayer's ability to pay.92 Health economists estimate that,
89. Andrews, supra note 59, at 335-37.
90. Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in
an 'Ideal' Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31
STAN. L. REV. 831, 858-79 (1979).
91. See Mark Kelman, Health Care Rights: Distinct Claims, Distinct Justifica-
tions, 3 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 90, 96 (1991) (noting that "people don't simply
demand some fixed quantity of medical care whenever they feel a certain way, no
more, no less").
92. FUCHS, supra note 47, at 43 ("Health seems to be a normal good in the
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while the quantity of health care demanded is less sensitive to
income than the consumption of other goods, the income elas-
ticity of demand for health care is very nearly one.9" In other
words, a 10% rise in income on average leads to a 10% increase
in the cost of health care consumed. Thus, wealthier taxpayers
consume both more and more expensive care. These data con-
firm that much of health care spending is actually discretion-
ary consumption, meant to upgrade the quality of individuals'
care rather than merely to pay the costs of returning them to
good health.
This analysis indicates that § 106 permits taxpayers who
purchase premium coverage to exclude income that reflects
personal consumption. When taxpayers purchase health cover-
age offering more than standard benefits, they are buying more
than insurance against the costs of being returned to a baseline
level of good health. The elements of coverage in excess of a
standard benefits package, at least in a sense, improve the
quality of their coverage. Purchasing the premium elements of
a health benefits package is a consumption decision that re-
flects the taxability of the consumer. In Andrews' words, it
reflects "choices among gratifications" rather than "differences
in need."94 Thus, while the ideal income tax base theory may
explain excluding the value of basic health coverage, it cannot
justify extending the exclusion to the premium elements of a
benefits package.
IV. THE IMPACT ON HEALTH POLICY
As the discussion to this point indicates, the current tax
treatment of health benefits is both underinclusive and
overextensive as a matter of tax policy. It is underinclusive
because it restricts those who may exclude or deduct the cost of
health benefits to those taxpayers with access to
employer-sponsored insurance. It is overextensive because it
permits taxpayers to exclude more from taxation than can be
justified by the government's objectives in maintaining the
exclusion. The current form of § 106 might still be warranted if
sense that an increase in wealth leads to an increase in the demand for health.");
Malshaw & Marmor, supra note 85, at 459 ("[UL]tilization of [medical] service ap-
pears more closely tied to economic status than to medical needs.").
93. VICTOR R. FUCHS & MARCIA J. KRAMER, DETEMINANTS OF EXPENDITURES
FOR PHYSICIANS' SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1948-1968, at 33 n.20 (1975).
94. Andrews, supra note 59, at 336.
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it furthered important health policy objectives. But, as the
following discussion demonstrates, its impact on health policy
has been decidedly detrimental. Indeed, § 106 has substantially
aggravated three significant problems in the health insurance
market-job lock, cost-unconscious demand, and excessive de-
mand.
A. Job Lock
Because of adverse selection, consumers must purchase
health coverage through groups for the insurance market to
operate at all efficiently." The group nexus need not be the
beneficiaries' employer; any sizable preexisting group may
serve this function.96 But because of the tax incentives, an
overwhelming majority of Americans with private health cover-
age obtain insurance through their employers. More than 85%
of all Americans with private health insurance obtain that
coverage through an employer.97 Indeed, over 92% of all em-
ployees of large and medium-sized firms-and 66% of all Amer-
icans-procure health coverage though employment-related
groups.
98
Making employers the dominant vehicle through which
Americans purchase their health insurance has had some unde-
sirable side effects.9 9 Foremost among them is the phenome-
non of "job lock," the term describing the situation of an em-
ployee who remains at her job solely to retain her health cover-
age. Employers are not required to offer health benefits, and
many American companies do not provide coverage due to its
expense."' Health insurance is particularly costly for small
95. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
96. See Greely, supra note 5, at 8-15 ("The group may be a group of employ-
ees, a labor union, a church congregation, or a professional association, among
others.").
97. Walter A. Zelman, The Rationale Behind the Clinton Health Care Reform
Plan, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1994, at 9, 17.
98. Joel C. Cantor et al., Business Leaders' Views on American Health Care,
HEALTH AFF., Spring 1991, at 98, 98.
99. See FUCHS, supra note 47, at 12 ("Sooner or later, the inequities and
inefficiencies associated with employment-based health insurance will become so
apparent as to dictate disengagement."); Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A
Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the 1990s: Universal Health Insurance in a Sys-
tem Designed to Promote Quality and Economy (Part II), 320 NEW ENG. J. MED.
94, 94-95 (1989) ("If we were making a fresh start in health insurance, we would
not recommend an employment-based system, because of the many problems associ-
ated with it."); Rockefeller, supra note 58, at 28 ("Losing one's job is bad enough,
but unemployment in America almost always means being uninsured.").
100. Wendy K Mariner, Problems with Employer-Provided Health Insur-
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businesses."0 ' While 51% of all jobs in the American economy
are with firms of one hundred or fewer employees, roughly
one-third of these companies do not offer health benefits to
their employees.' 2 In addition, 30% of the respondents to a
recent survey of small businesses said that they likely will
discontinue coverage in the foreseeable future.0 3 Changing
jobs-particularly moving to a smaller company-may therefore
mean the loss of health insurance.
As noted earlier, individuals who want health coverage but
who are unable to obtain employer-sponsored insurance are left
with two choices: individually underwritten insurance or insur-
ance administered through a group unrelated to employment.
These types of insurance are extremely expensive by compari-
son 10 4 and may offer much less comprehensive coverage than
does employer-sponsored insurance. Insurers charge higher
premiums and limit benefits for these types of coverage to
protect against adverse selection, 0 5 and consumers must pur-
chase these policies with after-tax dollars. Perhaps most impor-
tant, the majority of these types of insurance plans, particular-
ly those offered to small groups or individuals, exclude coverage
ance-The Employee Retirement Income Security Act and Health Care Reform, 327
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1682, 1682 (1992) (noting that, "[blecause of inflation in the
cost of health benefits during the past decade, many employers, especially small
companies without access to large-group insurance, find they cannot afford to fi-
nance health care fully").
101. See Bryan Dowd & Roger Feldman, Insurer Competition and Protection
from Risk Redefinition in the Individual and Small Group Health Insurance Mar-
ket, 29 INQUIRY 148 (1992); Jennifer N. Edwards et al., Small Businesses and the
National Health Care Reform Debate, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1992, 164; Alain C.
Enthoven, Commentary: Measuring the Candidates on Health Care, 327 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 807 (1992); Stanley B. Jones, Employer-Based Private Health Insurance
Needs Structural Reform, 29 INQUIRY 120 (1992); Kenneth E. Thorpe, Expanding
Employment-Based Health Insurance: Is Small Group Reform the Answer?, 29 IN-
QUIRY 128 (1992); Wendy K. Zellers et al., Small-Business Health Insurance: Only
the Healthy Need Apply, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1992, at 174. As Enthoven explains,
groups of one hundred beneficiaries or fewer "are too small to spread risk, achieve
economies of scale in administration, acquire and process the information needed to
make good decisions, and participate in managed competition." Enthoven, supra, at
807. Consequently, premiums for small businesses are much higher than those for
large employers.
102. Edwards et al., supra note 101, at 165.
103. Id. at 167.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 71-77.
105. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text. The problem is most acute
in the individual insurance market. Indeed, "most insurance companies have with-
drawn from the market for individual unsponsored coverage," and "[wihat remains
is mostly poor coverage at high prices." Enthoven, supra note 34, at 30.
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of preexisting conditions-health problems contracted by the
beneficiary prior to enrolling in the plan."'6 Preexisting condi-
tion exclusions mitigate the problem of adverse selection for
insurers, but they can make it impractical for individuals to
switch jobs.0 7  For instance, a woman who carries
employer-provided insurance for herself and her diabetic hus-
band may find it extremely difficult to change employment
without having to pay for all the costs of her husband's condi-
tion out of pocket for the first year at her new job. 08 If the
insured's condition is more serious, he may be completely unin-
surable once coverage is discontinued. Roughly eighty million
Americans currently have medical problems that insurance
companies might consider preexisting conditions, such as hy-
pertension, diabetes, or asthma.0 9 And, as of 1990, over 60%
of all group health insurance plans contained preexisting condi-
tion exclusions." With the average American changing jobs
106. Zellers et al., supra note 101, at 175.
107. See Eli Ginzberg, Health Care Reform-Where Are We and Where Should
We Be Going?, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1310, 1310 (1992) (stating that "people with
a history of serious medical problems often find that if they lose their coverage
they are unable to replace it at an affordable price"); Jeffrey R. Pettit, Help! We've
Fallen and We Can't Get Up: The Problems Families Face Because of
Employment-Based Health Insurance, 46 VAND. L. REV. 779, 795 (1993) ("Employed
workers may be forced to remain in their current jobs because they fear that a
new employer will exclude as a preexisting condition an illness or disability which
their health insurance currently covers.").
108. Ginzburg, supra note 107, at 1310. The average waiting period before an
insurance policy will cover costs related to a preexisting condition is nine months,
but may be as long as seven years. Id.
109. Thomas Bodenheimer, Underinsurance in America, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED.
274, 275 (1992).
110. Id. In June 1995, President Clinton announced his proposal for federal
regulation of the health insurance industry, which included provisions strictly cur-
tailing insurers' ability to include preexisting condition exclusions in their policy
contracts. Rich, supra note 13, at A21. Under the Administration's proposal, insur-
ers would be permitted to exclude coverage for preexisting conditions for up to six
months after an individual's first purchase of health insurance. Id. But when the
individual changed employment and enrolled in a new plan, the new insurer would
be prohibited from excluding coverage for any preexisting conditions. Id.
On July 13, 1995, Senators Kassebaum and Kennedy proposed their own
"Health Insurance Reform Act of 1995." See Adam Clymer, 2 Senators Offer New
Health Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1995, at Al. Their bill would also restrict
insurers' ability to exclude or limit coverage based on preexisting conditions. See S.
1028, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101, 103 (1995). Insurers could limit or exclude
coverage of preexisting conditions "only if-
(1) the limitation or exclusion extends for a period of not more than
12 months after the date of enrollment in the health plan;
(2) the limitation or exclusion does not apply to an individual who,
within 30 days of the date of birth, was covered under the plan;
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every 4.2 years,"' barriers to adequate health coverage, such
as the preexisting condition exclusion, may seriously impede
efficient transitional movement throughout the workforce."
Indeed, in a 1993 CBS/New York Times poll, one in three
Americans reported that someone in their household has re-
mained at a particular job due to concern about losing their
health benefits."'
Job lock would not exist if most Americans could obtain
affordable health insurance through groups unrelated to their
employment." For instance, if consumers purchased insur-
ance through geographically-based groups, health benefits
would be portable from one job to the next within the insured's
region; there would be no risk of losing coverage solely due to
changing employment." 5 Nevertheless, in the face of § 106,
purchasing through such groups would cost more than
employer-sponsored insurance. Absent comprehensive reform
that makes affordable coverage available to all Americans re-
gardless of health status, job lock cannot be redressed without
separating the purchase of health insurance from employ-
ment-possible only by altering the tax treatment of health
benefits.
(3) the limitation does not apply to a pregnancy existing on the effec-
tive date of coverage.
Id. § 103(a).
111. Bodenheimer, supra note 109, at 275.
112. FUCHS, supra note 47, at 12 ("Today workers' choices of job, decisions
about job change, and timing of retirement are frequently influenced by health
insurance considerations. As a result, labor market efficiency suffers."); Pettit, su-
pra note 107, at 795 (noting that job lock "stifles the potential of these [affected]
workers and reduces American productivity").
113. Steven Pearlstein, A Hard Pill to Swallow: Health Care Reform May Be
Bitter Economic Medicine, WASH. POST (weekly ed.), May 17-23 1993, at 6, 7.
114. Several reform proposals have emphasized the importance of separating
the purchase of health insurance from the employment setting. See, e.g., THE HERI-
TAGE FOUNDATION, A NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM FOR AMERICA (S. Butler & E.
Haislmaer eds., 1989), (discussed in Pauley et al., supra note 42, at 23).
115. Of course, establishing alternative group nexuses for health insur-
ance-while solving the problem of job lock-may create new problems. For in-
stance, if consumers were to purchase coverage through geographically-based
groups, insurance companies might attempt to charge higher premiums and to offer
limited coverage to beneficiaries living in low income communities because poorer
patients are actuarially more expensive to insure. These problems, however, seem
less complicated and easier to combat through government regulation.
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B. Cost-unconscious Demand for Health Insurance
With the proliferation of HMOs, preferred provider insur-
ance, and various other financing mechanisms, the American
health care system has moved increasingly toward a system, of
competition in recent years.116 For any competitive market to
function efficiently, consumer demand must be cost-conscious.
That is, consumers must choose between competitive products
or services based on their relative cost and quality. When de-
mand is not cost-conscious, consumers are less sensitive to
price in choosing among competing services, and efficient pro-
viders are largely unable to take advantage of their
cost-effectiveness.
For several reasons, cost-unconsciousness predominates in
the market for health insurance.117 The single most signifi-
cant factor is that over half of all employers offering health
coverage pay the entire cost of their employees' premiums."'
Because employers can deduct both wages and employee health
benefits as business expenses under § 162, they are generally
indifferent as to how employees allocate their compensation
between the two."' But because of § 106, employees receive
116. Enthoven, supra note 34, at 26; Luft, supra note 83, at 172 (noting the
"increasingly competitive U.S. health care environment"). See generally Kathleen
Day, Humana Hunts Gold in Health Care Field: Controversial Firm Now Bids To
Dominate the HMO Industry, WASH. PosT., July 22, 1993, at Al, A7. For evidence
of the increasing proliferation of HMOs and PPOs, see Ginzberg, supra note 107,
at 1311 (stating that the number of enrollees in managed care programs, such as
HMOs and PPOs, grew from roughly 10 million to 40 million during the 1980s);
Elizabeth W. Hoy et al., Change and Growth in Managed Care, HEALTH AFF.,
Winter 1991, at 18; Cynthia B. Sullivan & Thomas Rice, The Health Insurance
Picture in 1990, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1991, at 104.
117. See Pearlstein, supra note 113, at 6 (explaining that "[olther consumer
purchases, such as a car, involve some calculation of cost versus benefit," whereas
Imlost consumers make decisions about health care without regard to cost");
Shikles & Thompson, supra note 83, at 104 ("Because patients are shielded from
the direct costs of much of their care, any decisions they might make about types
of care involve little regard for cost.").
118. See Enthoven, supra note 34, at 32; see also Enthoven & Kronick, supra
note 35, at 29. Health care reform proposals aiming to infuse greater
cost-consciousness into consumers' purchasing decisions have argued that employer
contributions must be limited to a fixed amount. See id. at 33.
119. Because employer-provided health benefits are exempt from the Federal
Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) payroll tax, 26 U.S.C. § 3121(a)(2)(A), (B) (1988),
employers actually have a slight incentive to compensate employees in health bene-
fits over wages. Congress could dramatically alter employers' incentives-and infuse
cost-consciousness into the market for health insurance-by limiting the employer
deduction to the regionally-adjusted average ost of a standard benefits package.
Such a change would give employers a strong incentive to limit their contributions
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more value in each dollar devoted to health benefits than to
wages. 12' Thus, employees have a strong incentive to struc-
ture their compensation packages so that employers pay the
full cost of their health insurance. A 1986 study indicated that
more than 54% of all employers-not just those offering health
benefits-paid the entire cost of their employees' health insur-
ance.121 Most large companies offer their employees a choice
among plans, but where the employer covers the full cost re-
gardless of which package the employees chose, employees have
no incentive to discern between the plans based on cost or
efficiency.
Consider, for example, an employer offering two plans: an
HMO plan with a standard benefits package, which costs the
employer $150 per month per employee, and a premium,
fee-for-service plan, which costs the employer $250 per month.
Were the § 106 exclusion limited to the average cost of a stan-
dard benefits plan-here $150-an employee choosing the pre-
mium package would have to include the $100 difference in her
adjusted gross income. Granted, the employee would not bear
the full cost of choosing the more expensive plan. The after-tax
cost to the employee who selects the premium plan would only
be the actual difference in cost multiplied by her marginal tax
rate. Thus, a taxpayer in the 31% federal tax bracket and the
five percent state tax bracket would have to pay an additional
$36 per month in after-tax dollars to receive an additional $100
worth of coverage. In contrast, under the current regime of
§ 106, the employee bears none of the additional cost in select-
ing the more expensive plan. If her employer pays her entire
premium, her choice between the two plans is completely
cost-unconscious.
Some large employers, such as Xerox,122  Stanford
to employees' premiums, so that employees would have to pay the additional cost
of luxury benefit packages with after-tax dollars. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
WORKING GROUP ON HEALTH CARE REFORM, CONTROLLING COSTS AND FINANCING
HEALTH CARE REFORM THROUGH AN EMPLOYER-SPONSORED SYSTEM 15-17 (1993)
[hereinafter ABA WORKING GROUP]; Findlay, supra note 70, at 51. But see infra
text accompanying notes 130-34 (discussing how employees could still pay their
portion of health premiums with pretax dollars if their employer offers a "cafeteria
plan" under § 125). Former U.S. Representative Jim Cooper (D-Tenn.) included
such a provision in his proposed Managed Competition Act of 1992. H.R. 5936,
102d Cong. 2d Sess. (1992).
120. See infra text accompanying notes 140-43.
121. Enthoven, supra note 34, at 32; see also Enthoven & Kronick, supra note
35, at 29.
122. See Eric Falternayer, Yes, the Market Can Curb Health Costs, FORTUNE,
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University,'23 the State of Minnesota," and the State of
California,'25 have attempted to infuse cost-consciousness into
their employees' purchasing decisions by limiting their contri-
butions to health benefit packages.12' For instance, the Cali-
fornia Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), which
purchased more than $1.3 billion in health insurance premiums
for its employees in 1992, decided in 1990 to limit its monthly
contribution to $410 per family."' CalPERS members, who
constitute two thirds of all state and local government employ-
ees in California, must cover any additional cost themselves
with after-tax dollars. 2 ' In the first full year of the program,
health plan rates for CalPERS increased by "only 6 percent,
down from increases of 11 percent in 1990 and 17 percent in
1989. -129
But these efforts by employers to promote
cost-consciousness have been confounded by yet another provi-
sion of the tax code. Employers large enough to run such min-
iature "managed competition" programs also frequently offer
their employees "cafeteria plans."3 ' These plans, authorized
Dec. 28, 1993, at 84.
123. See Liz Lempert, Health Plan Expenditures Rising, STANDARD DAILY, Nov.
10, 1989, at 14.
124. See Faltermayer, supra note 122, at 84.
125. Danielle Starkey, Controlling Costs and Improving Access-Solving the
Health Care Dilemma, CAL. J., Feb. 1993, at 7, 10.
126. In 1996, for example, Stanford will offer its employees a choice of four
different plans:
Semi-Monthly Premium
Plan Employee Only Employee and Family
Kaiser $ 0.00 $33.00
FHPTakecare $11.00 $63.50
Blue Shield Triple Option $17.50 $80.50
Health Net $18.50 $83.00
Janet Basu, Drop in Kaiser Rates Affects Cost of All Plans, STAN. REP., Oct. 25,
1995, at 1, 3. Stanford limits its contributions to 94% of the lowest cost health
plan for its full-time employees, and contributes an additional $4.00 per pay period
(semi-monthly). Id.
127. Starkey, supra note 125, at 10.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 10-11. CalPERS has subsequently required all of the HMOs with
which it contracts to standardize their benefit packages, so that employees are
better able to comparison shop based on price and quality and not on such criteria
as level of copayments and -the minutiae of which services are covered. See Henry
T. Greely, Policy Issues in Health Alliances: Of Efficiency, Monopsony, and Equity,
5 HEALTH MATIX 37, 49 (1995).
130. See Enthoven, supra note 88, at A15.
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by § 125 of the tax code, permit employees to set aside pretax
dollars to purchase "qualified benefits."13' Health insurance is
a "qualified benefit" for purposes of § 125."2 Employees at
firms offering cafeteria plans can therefore use those plans to
pay for the portion of their premiums that exceeds the
employer's contribution. Thus, even when an employer offering
a cafeteria plan technically limits its contribution, employees
can still pay for the cost of their health benefits entirely with
pretax dollars. 1 3 "As a result, the employee's cost conscious-
ness is attenuated, and the health plan has less need to cut its
price to attract subscribers.""
For the health insurance market to operate efficiently, as
health economist Alain Enthoven has explained, consumers
"who choose one health plan that costs more than another
(adjusted for health risks of the covered groups) must pay the
extra cost with their own net after-tax dollars."135 Limiting
the § 106 exclusion to the average cost of a standard benefits
package and prohibiting the use of cafeteria plans to pay
health insurance premiums could go far in making consumers'
purchasing decisions cost-conscious, and thereby alleviate effi-
ciency-impeding, inflationary pressures on health care spend-
ing.
131. 26 U.S.C. § 125 (1988); see generally Daniel C. Schaffer & Daniel M. Fox,
Tax Law as Health Policy: A History of Cafeteria Plans 1978-1985, 8 A. J. TAX
PoLy 1 (1989).
132. 26 U.S.C. § 125 (1988).
133. See ABA WORKING GROUP, supra note 119, at 13-14 (stating that "many
believe that cafeteria arrangements seriously undermine health cost containment
and substantially increase tax expenditures"); Enthoven & Kronick, supra note 35,
at 30 (noting that when "an employee chooses a health plan that is more rather
than less costly, the government is likely to be paying about one-third of the dif-
ference in cost in the form of tax relief").
134. Enthoven & Kronick, supra note 35, at 30.
135. Enthoven, supra note 34, at 26. Enthoven calls cost-conscious demand
essential "[flor a market system in health care financing and delivery to produce a
reasonable approximation to efficiency and equity." Id.; see also Hilary Stout,
Benefits-Taxation Idea Returns to White House Under Clinton after Failing as a
Bush Proposal, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1992, at A10 (reporting that advocates of
greater cost-consciousness in the health insurance market "say the heightened con-
sumer discernment would . . . lead the health industry-everyone from doctors and
hospitals to health maintenance organizations and insurance companies-to compete
for business on price, quality and efficiency").
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C. Excessive Demand for Health Insurance
In addition to creating job lock and promoting
cost-unconscious demand, § 106 distorts the market for health
insurance by creating excessive demand for health benefits.1 36
Health insurance, like other employer-provided benefits, is part
of the overall compensation package offered by employers.137
Financial incentives created by the tax code, and particularly
§ 106, distort the cost of health benefits relative to cash wages.
As a result, employees allocate too large a portion of their total
compensation to health insurance.1 33
Consider a taxpayer in the 31% federal income tax and six
percent state income tax brackets whose employer pays the
entire cost of her health insurance. If her employer devotes an
additional $1,000 to wages, the employee nets $514 in dispos-
able income after income and payroll taxes.3 9 In contrast,
employer-sponsored health insurance is exempt not only from
the employee's and the employer's income taxes but also from
the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) payroll tax.' 40
Thus, if the employee elects instead to receive the $1,000 in
health benefits, she captures the full value of the increased
compensation. For $514 in foregone cash wages, the employee
receives $1,000 worth of health coverage. In negotiating
compensation packages with their employers, employees, there-
fore, will prefer health benefits over wages until the marginal
136. Although this seems to contradict the suggestion made earlier that con-
sumers might underpurchase health insurance, see supra note 12, the two issues
are conceptually distinct. While arguably too few consumers purchase private
health coverage, this article contends that those who do purchase coverage buy too
much.
137. See Fuchs, supra note 31, at 9 (noting that "[elmployers do not bear the
cost of health insurance; workers do, in the form of lower wages or foregone
nonhealth benefits").
138. See Feldstein, The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance, 81 J. POL.
ECON. 251 (1973). A recent historical study found that as early as 1978, "most
economists agreed that health insurance contributed to the rising costs of health
services" and that "tax law helped to inflate costs. Because employer-provided
health insurance was tax free, workers had reason to prefer health insurance to
other goods and services that they could purchase only out of after-tax income."
Schaffer & Fox, supra note 131, at 7.
139. The $1,000 represents $929 in strict wage increase and $71 in the
employer's attendant FICA payroll tax liability ($929 x 7.65%). Subtracting the
employee's share of the FICA payroll tax ($71), her federal income tax liability
($929 x 31%, or $288), and her state income tax liability ($929 x 6%, or $56), the
employee is left with $514 in disposable income from the raise.
140. 26 U.S.C. § 3121(a)(2)(A), (B) (1988).
141. For a similar example, see Greely, supra note 5, at 8-21 to 8-22.
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dollar devoted to health coverage is worth fifty-one cents to the
employee.142 For taxpayers in similar tax brackets, the tax
code, likewise, essentially halves the cost of health insurance.
Health policy experts widely acknowledge that the current
tax treatment of health benefits promotes excessive demand for
health insurance." As a group of health economists recently
wrote, "by permitting the purchase of health insurance with
pretax dollars, [the tax code] encourages people to buy more in-
surance than they need, thus fueling health care inflation."' 4
And although the rate of growth of health care expenditures
has tapered off slightly in the last two years, 45 health care
costs continue to consume an inordinate portion of the nation's
resources. The United States devotes a greater percentage of
its gross domestic product (GDP) to health care than any other
OECD country,4 ' exceeding by one-third the amount spent
142. Cf. ABA WORKING GROUP, supra note 119, at 10 (explaining that "most
workers prefer to get a compensation package comprised in part of nontaxable
benefits because those nontaxable benefits are more valuable than comparable
benefits purchased with after-tax dollars").
143. ABA WORKING GROUP, supra note 119, at 10 (noting that "economists are
concerned that the unlimited exclusion encourages the purchase of health insurance
that is not worth its full cost, ie., that tax subsidies encourage employees to buy
more generous health plans than workers would purchase themselves with after-tax
dollars"); Findlay, supra note 70, at 51 (reporting that President Clinton and other
Democrats acknowledge that the § 106 exclusion "gives the majority of Americans
an incentive to purchase excess health insurance"). But see Uwe E. Reinhardt, The
Clinton Plan: A Salute to American Pluralism, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1994, at 161,
171 (suggesting that analysts have overstated the effects of § 106 in artificially
stimulating demand for health insurance).
144. Pauly et al., supra note 42, at 9.
145. In 1993, national health care expenditures grew by 7.8%, down from
10.7% in 1990. Rich, supra note 13, at A21. The most recent estimate for 1994.is
6.1%. Id. From 1983 to 1993, health care expenditures grew at a rate roughly
double that of inflation. Pearlstein, supra note 113, at 7. Between 1970 and 1989,
per capita health care expenditures rose from $1,026 to $1,554 in constant dollars.
Eli Ginzberg, Health Care Reform-Why So Slow?, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1464,
1464 (1990).
146. John K Inglehart, Health Policy Report: Canada's Health Care System,
315 NEw ENG. J. MED. 202, 205 table 1 (1986). (The OECD is the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development.) In 1983, the U.S. total expenditure on
health care was 10.8% of GDP as compared to the OECD average of 7.6%. Id.; see
also Aki Yoshikawa et al., How Does Japan Do It? Doctors and Hospitals in a
Universal Health Care System, 3 STAN. L. & POL'y REV. 111, 115 figure 4 (1991).
American corporations have grown increasingly concerned that the costs of
health care are hindering their international competitiveness. The director of feder-
al relations for the Chrysler Corporation recently wrote that in 1988, "foreign
automakers [had] a $300 to $500 per car advantage over us due to health costs
alone." Walter B. Raher, Health Care in America: Implications for Business and the
Economy, 3 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 55, 56 (1991). Raher further stated that "were
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by any other major industrialized nation.'47 The Health Care
Financing Administration has projected that by the year 2000,
national health care expenditures will reach $1.7 trillion, 18.1%
of the GDP. 148 As the coordinator of the Clinton
Administration's ill-fated health care reform task force, Ira
Magaziner, recently wrote, "the current upward trajectory for
health care costs suggests that actions must be taken more
quickly to control costs in order not to imperil economic prog-
ress."149 Against this backdrop, a tax provision that stimu-
lates excessive demand for health benefits makes little sense.
V. CONCLUSION
The current tax treatment of employer-provided health
insurance is unsound both as tax policy and as health policy.
Section 106 inequitably benefits only those able to obtain
health insurance through their employers, taxpayers who gen-
erally are least in need of financial assistance in purchasing
health benefits. In addition, § 106 subsidizes the purchase of
premium benefit packages and relatively inefficient
fee-for-service insurance plans, both of which contribute to
health care inflation. At the same time, § 106 ties the purchase
of insurance to the employment setting-creating the problem
of job lock-and contributes significantly to the problems of
cost-unconsciousness and excessive demand in the health insur-
ance market.
To address these problems, Congress should implement
three basic alterations to the tax code's current treatment of
health benefits. First, Congress should extend § 106's exclusion
to all taxpayers, regardless of the source through which they
obtain coverage. 5 ° This would end the horizontal inequity be-
tween taxpayers who purchase through employers and those
we to consume health services in America at the same rate as that of West Ger-
many and Japan, we would have an extra $300 billion per year available to rein-
vest in our economy." Id. at 55.
147. Shikles & Thompson, supra note 83, at 103.
148. Id. The Congressional Budget Office reached the same conclusion. See
Priest, supra note 47, at A17. To put this projection in perspective, consider that
health care spending amounted to only 6% of U.S. GDP in 1965. Id.
149. Dana Priest, Stunting the Growth of Medical Costs: Clinton's Advisers
Draft Short-Term Options That Include Price Controls, WASH. POST (weekly ed.),
Feb. 22-28, 1993, at 32.
150. Thus, the deduction should be available to all taxpayers, not just those
who itemize their deductions and who obtain insurance through their employers.
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who obtain coverage by other means. It would also diminish
the incentive to purchase employer-sponsored insurance, mak-
ing it possible to separate the purchase of health insurance
from the employment setting. Second, Congress should limit
the value of the individual exclusion or deduction-as well as
the employer deduction-to the regionally-adjusted cost of an
efficiently administered standard benefits package. Under such
a restriction, employers would have a strong incentive to limit
their contributions to the cost of a standard benefits plan, and
taxpayers wishing to purchase premium packages or plans
employing less efficient reimbursement mechanisms would
have to pay the extra cost with after-tax dollars. 5' Consumer
decisions would therefore be more cost-conscious, dampening
the incentive for taxpayers to overpurchase health coverage
and eliminating the government subsidy of the premium ele-
ments of health care packages. Finally, to preserve the
cost-consciousness created by limiting the exclusion, Congress
should alter § 125 to prevent employees from using cafeteria
plans to pay their portions of their insurance premiums with
pretax dollars.
These reforms make particular sense in light of the current
political mood favoring incremental, market-driven reforms to
health care financing. The demise of the Clinton health plan is
largely attributable to its comprehensiveness and its preference
for command-and-control regulatory solutions.' 52 Americans
resisted any drastic change-particularly through direct gov-
151. If the § 106 exclusion is capped, it is crucial that the limit be
dollar-denominated. In other words, while the limit should be based on the
regionally-adjusted cost of a standard benefits package, it must be a uniform flat
dollar cap. See Enthoven, supra note 88, at A15. Some proposals have suggested
that the limit be benefit-denominated, permitting a full exclusion or deduction for
coverage offering no more than standard benefits regardless of price. See ABA
WORKING GROUP, supra note 119, at 5-6. But this would fall short of infusing true
cost-consciousness into the market. Taxpayers purchasing standard benefits packag-
es would remain less sensitive to price, and insurers' incentive to improve efficien-
cy would remain dampened. Enthoven, supra note 88, at A15. As Enthoven recent-
ly wrote, a benefits-denominated cap "simply does not address the incentives prob-
lem." Id. Rather, a benefits-denominated cap would mean that the "federal govern-
ment would continue to be in the way, taxing efficient choices, subsidizing wasteful
choices." Id.
152. See generally Robert J. Blendon et al., What Happened to Americans' Sup-
port for the Clinton Health Plan?, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1995, at 7. In discussing
the Administration's effort at health care reform in his January 1995 State of the
Union Message, President Clinton conceded, "We bit off more than we could chew."
Spencer Rich, Clinton Offers a Limited Version of Health Reform, WASH. POST, Jan.
26, 1995, at All.
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ernmental involvement-to the delivery or financing of some-
thing so personally important. At the same time, the Adminis-
tration underestimated the political difficulties in comprehen-
sively reforming an industry comprising one-sixth of the U.S.
economy and affecting the operation of every American busi-
ness. The reforms suggested here are modest by comparison,
and they are consistent with current political preferences for
market-based regulatory measures. 5 ' Instilling greater
cost-consciousness in consumers' health insurance purchasing
decisions would promote important public policy objectives
through purely voluntary consumer choices.
Nonetheless, these reforms still face stiff opposition."
Several potent political forces, most notably organized labor,
have vehemently opposed any change in the tax law's treat-
ment of employer-sponsored health insurance.'55 Many tax-
payers who benefit from the exclusion are also likely to raise
fierce resistance.'56 Like the home mortgage interest deduc-
153. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulato-
ry State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 10 (1995) ("The government should shift from
command-and-control regulation to more experimentation with . . . economic incen-
tives.").
154. Most recently, in March 1994, the House Ways and Means Subcommitte
on Health rejected the inclusion of a limit on the health benefits exclu-
sion/deduction in the Clinton Administration's health care reform package. Robert
Pear, Employer-Paid Health Care Backed by House Panel, 6-5, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
15, 1994, at A16. The only serious attempt to alter the tax treatment of
employer-provided health insurance thus far during the 104th Congress was recent-
ly proposed by House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt. Clay Chandler, Gephardt
Offers Proposal to Cut Income Tax Rate: Democrat Says Plan Helps Working and
Middle Class, WASH. POST, July 7, 1995, at C1. Gephardt's plan would reduce the
basic marginal rate for three-fourths of American taxpayers to 10%, and it would
eliminate most deductions and exclusions, including that for employer-provided tax
insurance. Id.
155. JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT Gucci GULCH:
LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRiuMPH OF TAX REFORM 82-83 (1987);
Peter Kerr, Health-Care Planners Urge a Tax on Workers' Benefits, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 1993, at Al, C2; Rick Wartzman, White House Rules Out Insurance Tax
for Health Care, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1993, at A2 ("Union officials, led by the
AFL-CIO, have been arguing that a tax on health benefits would be an affront to
their collective bargaining efforts."). Robert R. McGlotten, director of legislation for
the AFL-CIO stated that "[tihere is no rhyme or reason to tax health care bene-
fits.... The fact of the matter is that I have a health care program that my
employer pays for. We essentially realized as a nation long ago that it was impor-
tant for employers to help employees." Kerr, supra, at C2. Another spokesperson
for the AFL-CIO has said, "employer provided health benefits are not income and
therefore shouldn't be treated as such and subject to taxes, period." Lynn Wagner,
Cap on Tax-Free Health Benefits Seen as Major Bone of Contention in Push To-
ward Health Reform, MODERN HEALTHcARE, Jan. 4, 1993, at 25. Business groups
also reportedly oppose limiting the exclusion. Kerr, supra, at C2.
156. For instance, in his successful senatorial campaign in 1991, former Sena-
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tion, the exemption of employer-sponsored benefits has become
an entrenched part of the American political landscape. As
such, most taxpayers will perceive any limit on the exclusion as
a new tax on health coverage. 5 ' Thus, although Clinton Ad-
ministration officials spoke seriously of limiting the exclusion
during and immediately following the 1992 presidential cam-
paign, 5 ' the task force on health care reform officially with-
drew the idea from consideration only one month after
convening.159 Persevering in the face of political pressure,
however, could reap sizable long-term benefits. Reforming the
tax treatment of employer-sponsored health coverage is vital to
containing the growth of health care expenditures and to treat-
ing taxpayers more equitably.
tor Harris Wofford attacked Richard Thornburg for favoring a cap on the exclusion.
Kerr, supra note 155, at C2. One of Wofford's television advertisements ran, "Tax
on health care benefits? ... Thornburg. He's been in Washington too long." Id.
157. See Katherine Pratt, Funding Health Care with an Employer Mandate:
Efficiency and Equity Concerns, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 155 n.20 (1994) ("If families
have to make up premiums formerly paid by an employer, they would perceive
that as a tax increase."); Wagner, supra note 155, at 25.
158. See, e.g., Findlay, supra note 70, at 51; Kerr, supra note 155, at Al, C2;
Wagner, supra note 155, at 25.
159. Wartzman, supra note 155, at A2.
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